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VOLUNTARY UNIONISM VERSUS
SOLIDARITY-

RESTRICTING A UNION

MEMBER'S RIGHT TO RESIGN:
PATTERN MAKERS' LEAGUE OF
NORTH AMERICA v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD
HE Pattern Makers' League of North America, a national labor
union, amended its constitution in 1976 by adding League Law 13
that prohibited resignations of members during a strike.I The following year the League's collective bargaining agreement with the RockfordBeloit Pattern Jobbers Association expired, and a strike ensued. Eleven of
the League's members tendered resignation of their memberships and returned to work after the League rejected a new contract proposed by the
Association. In the eighth month of the strike the League agreed to a new
contract and its remaining members returned to work. The League notified
ten of the workers who had returned to work during the strike that it had
not accepted their resignations.2 The League asserted that these employees
were still members of the union subject to its discipline and then fined the
ten workers an amount roughly equivalent to the wages they earned during
the strike. Subsequently, the Association filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB) alleging that the fines constituted an unfair
labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations
3
Act.
The NLRB ruled that the League's practice was unlawful, reasoning that
it violated the workers' right to refrain from concerted activity,4 and entered
1. League Law 13 provides that "[n]o resignation or withdrawal from an Association, or
from the League, shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or
lockout appears imminent." Pattern Makers' League of North America v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct.
3064, 3066, 87 L. Ed. 2d 68, 71 (1985).

2. The union expelled the eleventh worker, the first union member to resign.
3. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair
the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein ....
4. Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) establishes a worker's right to refrain from concerted
activity:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own

choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
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an order upholding the resignations and striking down the fines.5 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the order
over a challenge by the League. 6 The League appealed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in order to resolve a conflict between the circuits
over the correct interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 7 Held, af-

firmed: The restriction on a union member's right to resign constitutes restraint and coercion under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor
Relations Act and violates the member's right to refrain from concerted ac-

tivity. PatternMakers' League of North America v. NationalLabor Relations
Board, 105 S. Ct. 3064, 87 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1985).
I.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO RESIGN CONFLICT

A.

GeneralHistory of Labor Regulation

The Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act) of 1935 instituted a new

era for American labor organizations.8 Prior to its passage, American courts
in the nineteenth century enforced the English common law doctrine of
criminal conspiracy against striking workers. 9 Later, the courts considered
workers as acting in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act 10 when they

resorted to concerted labor action. I I The depression of the 1930s, however,

effectively ended management's stronghold over labor. Congress enacted the

Wagner Act as an integral part of New Deal legislation. 12 Congress hoped
the Wagner Act would stimulate the economy by raising workers' wages and
avoiding strikes. 13
Three provisions of the Wagner Act proved especially significant for labor. First, section 7 granted workers the right to form labor organizations
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right

to refrain from any or all of such activities ....
5. Pattern Makers' League of North America, 265 N.L.R.B. 1332, 1334-35 (1982).
6. Pattern Makers' League of North America v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57, 61 (7th Cir. 1983).
7. Pattern Makers' League of North America v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct. 79, 83 L. Ed. 2d 27
(1984). The Ninth Circuit had upheld union restrictions on members' rights to resign in Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 1984).
8. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1982)). See B. TAYLOR & F. WHITNEY, LABOR
RELATIONS LAW 156-57 (1st ed. 1971). The authors state that modern industrialism and the
growth of big business led to the general realization that bargaining individually was obsolete.
See id.
9. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFr-HARTLEY 5 (1950).
The authors state that criminal conspiracy doctrines gave management a powerful weapon
against labor organizations and resulted in harsh punishment of many union leaders. See id.;
see also B. TAYLOR & F. WHITNEY, supra note 8, at 69-70 (authors conclude the judiciary
proved a willing ally to employers in labor-management disputes).
10. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1973 & Supp.
1986)).
11. See B. TAYLOR & F. WHITNEY, supra note 8, at 69-70.
12. See id. at 157.
13. Id. Congress aimed the New Deal legislation at pulling the country out of the depression. Under New Deal policy the public's wages were to be increased. These higher wages
would result in an increase in the demand for goods. The collective bargaining authorized by
the Wagner Act was one step toward increasing the workers' wages. Id.
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and bargain collectively. 14 Second, section 8 prohibited employers from interfering with employee efforts to organize, discriminating against union
members, and refusing to bargain with union representatives. 15 Third, the
16
Wagner Act created the NLRB with limited powers to administer the Act.
The Taft-Hartley Act of 194717 shifted the focus of concern from the employee-employer relationship to the employee-union relationship. Congress
intended the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act to protect the
individual worker from the union.18 Congress thus amended section 7 of the
Wagner Act to allow workers the right to refrain from union activities 1 9 and
added section 8(b)(1)(A), which prohibited unions from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. 20 These provisions
gave workers an important freedom previously unavailable under the Act. 21
Within this background the NLRB and the courts have struggled to define
22
the proper role of union discipline over its members.
B. Substantive Limitations on Union Discipline
The National Labor Relations Act allows a labor organization to enact
rules enforcing internal discipline. 23 The Supreme Court, however, has limited the union's right to discipline in two important ways. First, the Court
has interpreted the Act's internal discipline proviso at section 8(b)(1)(A) as
limiting union discipline to solely internal affairs. 24 While that section of the
Act prohibits restraint and coercion of employees, the internal discipline
14. See C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 26, 28 (1971). The right to concerted activities was essential to a balance of power between labor and management. Prior to
the Act, management would often create a company union and bargain solely with that union.
See id. at 26.
15. See H. MYERS, LABOR LAW AND LEGISLATION 450 (1968). The protection given by
§§ 7 and 8 allowed unions to grow and prosper under congressionally sanctioned collective
bargaining.
16. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 9, at 31. The NLRB has the power to investigate, hold hearings, and issue orders, but only the United States courts of appeals can enforce
these orders. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c), 160(e) (1982).
17. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1973 &
Supp. 1986)).
18. See B. TAYLOR & F. WHITNEY, supra note 8, at 207. The new amendments expressed
concern for individual freedoms. Congress intended to deal with union coercion, excessive
union fees, and union use of pressure on employers to affect an employee's job status. See
Silard, Labor Regulation of Union Discipline After Allis-Chalmers, Marine Workers, and
Scofield, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (1969). The author argues that Congress originally intended the amendments to protect the nonmember, but subsequent national sentiment
differed from the intent of Congress. See id.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982); H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 9, at 421.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1982).
21. See C. MORRIS, supra note 14, at 40.
22. At the time of the Taft-Hartley Act's passage, Archibald Cox predicted substantial
future litigation concerning the Act due to the vagueness of terms such as "restraint" and
"coerce." "The scope and variety of ... problems suggest that Section 8(b)(I) may plunge the
Board into a dismal swamp of uncertainty." Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33 (1947).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982); see NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175,
178 (1967).
24. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967). The NLRB first
announced this limitation in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727, 729 (1954).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

proviso also authorizes union rules relating to the acquisition and retention
of membership. The Court has resolved this apparent inconsistency by holding that if the matter truly involves an internal affair, the union may discipline the member.2 5 Section 8(b)(2) of the Act enforces this distinction by
providing that the union cannot pressure the employer to discriminate
against or fire an employee or otherwise affect the employee's employment
status for any reason other than his failure to pay dues. 26 If the union regulation or its enforcement affects the member's employment status, the courts
consider the regulation external enforcement and will disallow it.27
The Court has held that fines levied by unions constitute internal enforcement of union regulations and are valid.2 8 In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 29 the Supreme Court determined that fines are necessary for

the survival of weaker unions. 30 Without the availability of fines, weak unions have the option of either expelling an offending member and further
weakening their ranks through lost membership or tolerating the misconduct the regulation prevents. 3 1 The Court stated that without the internal
enforcement provision the unions could not continue in their role as exclu32
sive statutory bargaining agents under section 9(a) of the Act.
The second substantive limitation on union discipline rests in the Court's
The NLRB ruled in favor of a union fine imposed on a member who failed to carry out his
picket duties.
25. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967).
26. The National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee... to whom membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues
and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership....
27. See Comment, The Inherent Conflict Between Sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) of the National
Labor Relations Act-Union Attempts to Discipline Resigning Strikebreakers, 1978 Wis. L.
REV. 859, 861; Note, Into the Mire of Uncertainty: Union DisciplinaryFines and NLRA Section 8(b)(l)(A), 84 W. VA. L. REV. 411, 413 (1982). The Note's author states that disciplinary
action that affects the employee's job rights is within the NLRB's jurisdiction. Disciplinary
action affecting the relationship of the union and member is internal, and the NLRB has no
jurisdiction. Id. The following acts have been identified as concerning internal affairs: (1) returning to work while still a member of the union during a strike (NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967)); (2) producing in excess of union imposed ceilings
(Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 429 (1969)); and (3) voluntarily turning in other members to
the employer for violating work rules (Communication Workers of America, 192 N.L.R.B.
556, 557 (1971)).
28. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967).
29. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
30. Id. at 183.
31. Id.; see Millan, DisciplinaryDevelopments Under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 20 Loy. L. REV. 245, 246 (1974).
32. 388 U.S. at 183. National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) provides: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees ... shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees .... "
For a criticism of the use of fines, see Wellington, Union Finesand Workers' Rights, 85 YALE
L.J. 1022, 1023 (1976). Wellington does not agree that enforcing fines in a court constitutes
internal enforcement. He argues that fines affect the employment status since unions impose
the discipline for working and concludes that fines thus touch on external affairs. Id.
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concern over public policy. The union may not discipline a member when
doing so contravenes established national labor policy. 33 The Supreme
Court first established this limitation in NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine
& Shipbuilding Workers. 34 In this case, a union constitution provided that
no employee could file charges with the NLRB without first exhausting all
available union remedies. The Court held that the overriding public policy
of unimpeded access to the NLRB outweighed any union interest in the matter. 35 The Court stated that any act limiting access to the NLRB was not a
legitimate interest of the labor union, even if the regulation involved internal
union affairs. 36 The effect of this limitation is that any rule invading or frus37
trating an overriding policy of the labor laws may not be enforced.
C. The Worker's Right to Resign Prior to Pattern Makers' v. NLRB
Four United States Supreme Court cases have specifically addressed the
relationship between the National Labor Relations Act's internal discipline
proviso and the right of a union member to resign. The earliest of these,
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.38 dealt with members who returned to work during a strike without first resigning their union membership. The union attempted to fine the workers and urged that the internal
discipline proviso of section 8(b)(1)(A) allowed the union to make rules concerning the retention of membership. The Court held that the union could
discipline members who crossed the picket line and returned to work during
33. See Rapore, Protected Rights and Union Sanctions Under Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 21 LAB. L.J. 728, 732 (1970); Note, Union DisciplinaryFines
and the Right to Resign, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 664, 668-69 (1973). The author states that
discipline is allowable only if a two-part test is met: that the discipline involves a legitimate

union interest, and the discipline impairs no labor policy. Id. at 669.
34. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
35. Id. at 424.
36. Id. One commentator has criticized the public policy limitation as being too vague.
Because of the vagueness of the policy test, members do not have sufficient guidelines in advance of the potential consequences of a particular action. Wellington, supra note 32, at 1028.

37. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 429 (1969); see also Millan, supra note 31, at 255
(public policy limitation separate and distinct from internal affairs limitation analysis); Note,
Restrictions on the Right to Resign: Can a Member's Freedom to "Escape the Union Rule" be
Overcome by Union Boilerplate?,42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397, 405 (1974) (courts place additional emphasis on national labor policy involved).

Other limitations on union discipline also exist. The Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 imposed
procedural limitations on union discipline. See 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(5) (1982). Before a member
may be disciplined, he must be served with specific, written charges, given a reasonable time to
prepare his defense, and afforded a full and fair hearing. Id.; see D. MCLAUGHLIN & A.
SCHOOMAKER, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT AND UNION DEMOCRACY 74 (1979); see also
Beaird & Player, Union Discipline of its Membership Under Section 101(a)(5) of LandrumGriffin: What is "Discipline" and How Much Process is Due?, 9 GA. L. REV. 383, 400-15
(1975) (discussing development of case law concerning procedural due process); Cox, Internal
Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 819-23

(1960) (although statute contains ambiguities, procedural guarantees will aid long-term development of labor law).

38. 388 U.S. 175 (1967). For a background on the dispute over the right to resign, see
Gould, Solidarity Forever-OrHardly Ever: Union Discipline, Taft-Hartley, and the Right of
Union Members to Resign, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 74, 79-86 (1980); Johannesen, Disciplinary

Fines as Interference with Protected Rights, 24 LAB. L.J. 268, 269-77 (1973).
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a lawful strike.3 9 The Court based its decision on two arguments, one based
on policy and one based on legislative history.
First, the Allis-Chalmers Court noted that the national labor policy was
based on the theory that employees could get better wages and working conditions acting as a unit, and that in return for these benefits, the employee
should surrender his individual rights to bargain with the employer. 4° Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the union could not effectively carry
out its function as the exclusive statutory bargaining agent without the
4
power to discipline its members. '
Second, the Allis-Chalmers Court relied on the legislative history of the
Taft-Hartley Act to reach its holding. 42 Senators stated several times during
debate that Congress did not intend to interfere with the union's internal
affairs.4 3 The internal discipline proviso states that section 8(b)(1)(A) will
not prevent the union from making its own rules concerning the acquisition
or retention of membership. The Court concluded that since the union can
make such rules, and since section 8(b)(1)(A) was not intended to regulate
internal affairs, fines were permissible for members who crossed the picket
line.44 The distinguishing feature between this case and the subsequent cases
is that the employees remained members of the union during the time they
45
returned to work.

Scofield v. NLRB 4 6 offered the Court a chance to refine the Allis-Chalmers
holding. In this case the employer p4id the workers based on their output.
The union, however, set a ceiling on the amount that each member could
produce. The union rule called for fines and expulsion as punishment for
violators.
In upholding the validity of the union's disciplinary measures the Court
47
outlined a three-part test to determine the enforceability of a union rule.
39. 388 U.S. at 195.
40. Id. at 180. The Court has stated previously that the union is similar to a legislative
body. The union has the power to "create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents."
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
41. 388 U.S. at 181. One commentator pointed out that the alternative to fines, explusion,
would lead to the expelled members joining rival unions or returning to work during the strike.
The union's effectiveness depends on its control of labor, and the threat of expulsion does not
necessarily aid in this control. Summers, DisciplinaryPowers of Unions, 3 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 483, 487-88 (1950). Another commentator argues that if a mass exodus of members has

weakened the strike movement, the strike may not be the preferred action of the members.
Wellington, supra note 32, at 1044.
42. 388 U.S. at 183-85.
43. Senator Ball stated, "[i]t was never the intention of the sponsors of the pending
amendment to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of unions." 93 CONG. REC.
4272 (1947). In referring to the proviso of § 8(b)(l)(A), Senator Ball remarked: "That modification is designed to make it clear that we are not trying to interfere with the internal affairs of
a union which is already organized." 93 CONG. REC. 4433 (1947). Concerning § 8(b)(2) Senator Taft explained "[t]he pending measure does not propose any limitation with respect to the
internal affairs of unions." 93 CONG. REC. 4193 (1947).
44. 388 U.S. at 195.
45. See id. at 176. In cases following Allis-Chalmers the workers resigned their membership, presenting a different scenario.
46. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
47. Id. at 430. The test evolved from NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S.
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The Court stated that for a union rule to be enforceable, it must reflect a
legitimate union interest, impair no policy Congress has imbedded in the
labor laws, and be reasonably enforced against union members who are free
to leave the union and escape the rule.4 8 The Court recognized that under
the production ceiling rule the possibility of discrimination between the
members and nonmembers existed since the ceiling did not limit the nonmembers. 49 The Court stated that any differences between the two classes
existed because the members had voluntarily chosen to retain their union
membership. 50 The Court held that the union met the three-part test.5 1
NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board52 involved members who resigned
53
union membership before returning to work during a lawful strike.
Although neither the union constitution nor the labor contract contained
provisions restricting the members' ability to resign, the union fined these
workers. The workers charged that the fines restrained and coerced them
under section 8(b)(1)(A) in violation of their section 7 rights to refrain from
concerted activity.5 4 The Court relied on the Scofield test in reaching its
decision that the union's power over a member ceases when he resigns from
the union. 55 The Court determined that the union had failed the second part
of the Scofield test, which states that a union rule cannot impair public policy, because the union fined members for resigning when no contractual obli56
gation prohibited resignations.
The union advanced an argument that members should be subject to fines
for resigning membership because of the mutual reliance of all union members. In rejecting the mutual reliance theory, the Granite State Court focused on the practical effects on the member. 57 The Court noted that the
418, 424-25 (1968). In that case the Court held that if a union rule violated public policy, the
rule went beyond the legitimate interest of the union.
48. 394 U.S. at 430.
49. Id. at 434-35.
50. Id. at 435. The Court noted that one factor involved in its holding was the voluntary

nature of the membership. Id.
51. Id. at 436; see Note, Union Power to Fine Membersfor Overworking, 10 CASE W. RES.
669, 673 (1969). The author criticizes the Scofield holding as being outside the Allis-Chalmers
rationale since the production ceilings, in effect, are a condition.of employment, and thus beyond the scope of internal affairs. See also Note, A Union's Suit Against Members to Collect
Fines Assessed for Violation of a Union Bylaw Imposing a Production Ceilingis not Restraint or

Coercion Under Section 8(b)(1)(A), 48 TEXAS L. REV. 238, 241 (1969) (criticizing Allis-Chalmers holding because it restrains members' right to earn income).
52. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
53. See Note, Absent Provisions in a Collective-BargainingContractor the Union's Constitution or Bylaws Restricting a Union Member's Right to Resign, Any Imposition of Fines Upon
Employees Who Resign From the Union Prior to Breaking Strike Rules is an Unfair Labor

Practice Under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NationalLabor Relations Act, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 176,
179-87 (1973); Note, Illegality of Union Fines, 40 TENN. L. REV. 521, 523-26 (1973).
54. 409 U.S. at 215. The workers argued that if they must make a choice between striking
or paying fines, they are in effect being coerced into joining concerted activity. Id.
55. Id. at 215-16.
56. Id. at 216-17.
57. Id. at 217. The mutual reliance theory states that when a worker votes to strike, he

casts his vote believing all other members will support him if a strike follows. According to
the theory, each member makes a promise to the other members to abide by the union vote.
The theory concludes that each member should be bound by his vote. See Note, The Rights of
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longer a strike lasts, the greater the hardship on each worker. Because the
hardships may be much more severe than originally anticipated, the member
must be free to change his mind. 58 The Court held that when a union constitution is silent concerning the right to resign, the individual may resign at
will.5 9 The Court, however, specifically reserved judgment on the legal effect
60
of a restriction on the right to resign in a union constitution.
In Booster Lodge v. NLRB 6 1 the union constitution expressly prohibited
members from returning to work during a strike. Sixty-one members attempted to circumvent the constitution by first resigning their memberships
and then returning to work. The union imposed fines on these workers. The
employer asserted that the fines were coercive under section 8(b)(1)(A) and
that the Granite State holding prohibited the union from fining members
who had resigned. The union countered that since the workers agreed to the
provision in the union constitution prohibiting strike-breaking while they
were still members, the workers remained bound even after they resigned.
The Court rejected the union's argument, concluding that the fines consti62
tuted an unfair labor practice.
As in the GraniteState case, the Court relied on the theory of free institutions. The theory of free institutions states that an individual has the right
to join and resign from an association at will, provided he has not agreed to
any limitation on that right. 63 The Court reasoned that since the constitution did not expressly apply to nonmembers, it was inapplicable to the resigning workers. 64 The Court once again expressly left open the question of
what effects a union provision restricting resignations would have. 65
Unions to Fine Members Who Have Engaged in Strike-BreakingActivities After Resigningfrom
the Union During a Strike, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1272, 1281 (1972).
58. 409 U.S. at 217-18. The Court stated that "the vitality of § 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in May." Id. Factors the
Court mentioned that would cause a member to change his mind included the length of the
strike and the availability to the employer of replacement workers. Id. at 216. One commentator has disagreed with the applicability of the mutual reliance theory. He noted that a mem-

ber does not waive his right not to strike unless the waiver is express and supported with
knowledge of the anticipated consequences. Millan, supra note 31, at 263-64. Another problem with applying a contract theory such as mutual reliance to labor relationships is that the
members are bound to the rules and discipline, but the union can change these rules at any
time. See Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under the NationalLabor Relations
Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1067, 1101. Other problems include
the turnover of employees, the conflicting interests of the members and the union, and the fact
that the union does not always answer immediately to the majority. See Cox, Rights Under a
Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REV. 601, 604 (1956).
59. 409 U.S. at 217.
60. Id.
61. 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
62. Id. at 90. The Court determined that the workers had resigned and were no longer
subject to union rule. It held that the union can impose discipline only upon members. Id.
63. Id. at 88.
64. Id. at 89.
65. Id. at 88; see Note, Union Power to Discipline Members Who Resign, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1536, 1543-45 (1973) (arguing that mutual reliance should be rejected because member's
contract is an adhesion contract and implying terms against the worker in such a situation is
unfair).
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PATTERN MAKERS' LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA V. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD

In Pattern Makers' League of North America v. National Labor Relations
Board the Supreme Court squarely addressed a union's right to restrict
members' ability to resign when a union rule forbids resignation during a
strike. The Court determined that union fines imposed on workers who resigned in violation of such a rule violated sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Taft-Hartley Act by infringing upon the workers' rights to refrain from concerted activities. 6667The Court's decision resolved a conflict between the circuits on the issue.
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Pattern Makers' by articulating
the standard of review applicable to the NLRB's interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act. 68 Since the NLRB has expertise in labor law, the
Court subjects the interpretations of the NLRB only to limited judicial re69
view, thereby giving the NLRB's determinations substantial deference.
The Court noted that, in cases involving fines, it had historically granted
great weight to the NLRB's decisions and that the NLRB had taken a consistent stand on these cases. 70 The Court thus limited the scope of its review
71
to the reasonableness of the NLRB's interpretation.
The Court's analysis of the case can be divided into three parts. First, the
Court examined the Taft-Hartley Act itself. Second, the Court analyzed the
public policy the Taft-Hartley Act manifests. Third, the Court addressed
the arguments of the union.
A.

Taft-Hartley Act

The Court began its analysis in PatternMakers' with section 7 and section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Under section 7 union members have
66. 105 S. Ct. at 3068, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 72.
67. The Seventh Circuit had held that union fines imposed on workers who resigned in
violation of a union rule forbidding resignation during a strike frustrated the overriding public
policy that employees be free to choose whether or not to engagq in concerted activities. Pattern Makers' League of North America v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57, 61 (7th Cir. 1983). See generally Comment, Protesting a Union Member's Right to Resign-Resolution of the Conflict
Between Dalmo Victor and Rockford-Beloit, 38 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1985) (attempting to
resolve conflicting holdings of Seventh and Ninth Circuits)[hereinafter cited as Comment, Protesting]; Note, A Union's Right to Control Strike-PeriodResignations, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 339
(1985) (analyzing Seventh Circuit's holding). A Ninth Circuit decision directly conflicted with
the Seventh Circuit decision. Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984);
see Comment, Union Security and Union Members' Freedom to Resign: The National Labor
Relations Board's Thirty-Day Rule in Dalmo Victor, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 593, 610 (1983)
(discussing NLRB's ruling and its consistency with previous Court holdings).
68. 105 S. Ct. at 3068, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 73.
69. Id.; see NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1975) (quoting NLRB v.
Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)). In Weingarten the Court stated that the
NLRB had the responsibility of adapting the statute to modem industrial problems. 420 U.S.
at 266. The Court has stated that the primary responsibility of the NLRB is to interpret the
Act. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979).
70. 105 S. Ct. at 3075-76, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 82-83.
71. Id. at 3068, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 73.
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the right to refrain from concerted activities. 72 Section 8(b)(1)(A) enforces
section 7 by prohibiting the restraint and coercion of workers exercising
these rights.73 Upon finding that earlier judicial interpretations of the Act
departed from strict literal reading of sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A), the Court
analyzed the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act in an effort to define
the section 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) rights.
In interpreting the language of section 7 the Court distinguished between
the internal and external affairs of the union. 74 The Court, relying on the
legislative history of the Act, stated that Congress did not intend the Act to
interfere with a union's internal affairs. 75 The Court noted that internal affairs had never been interpreted to encompass the right to resign, and
pointed out that in 1947, when Congress passed the Act, the right to resign
was not a major issue.76 The Court reasoned that since Congress did not
contemplate the idea of resignation restrictions when it debated the TaftHartley Act, it did not intend the Act's definition of internal affairs to include the right to resign. 77 The Court thus ruled that unions can enact rules
to retain membership under the internal discipline proviso, but these rules
must be limited to matters concerning legitimate internal affairs and must
78
not include restrictions on the right to resign.
The Court further supported its interpretation of the internal discipline
proviso by analyzing prior Supreme Court opinions concerning the right to
resign. In Scofield the Court set forth a three-part test to determine the
enforceability of a union rule.79 The third part of that test required that
members be free to escape the rule by leaving the union.80 Granite State
further emphasized the importance of the right to resign by requiring that a
member must be free to change his mind from an earlier strike vote.8 1 The
inCourt reasoned that the two cases further proved that Congress did 8not
2
tend internal affairs to encompass restrictions on the right to resign.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
73. Id. § 158(b)(1)(A).
74. 105 S. Ct. at 3069, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 75.

75. Id.
76. See Wellington, supra note 32, at 1042. Even as late as the 1970s restrictions on the
right to resign were uncommon. One of the motivating factors behind the appearance of these
restrictions is the Court's language in the GraniteState and BoosterLodge decisions. See supra
notes 52-65 and accompanying text. Because the Court reserved judgment on the effect of
right-to-resign restrictions, unions began to include the restrictions in their constitutions and
bylaws. Millan, supra note 31, at 269.
77. 105 S. Ct. at 3069, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 75. In addressing § 8(b)(1)(A) Senator Taft stated
All it would
that the section "would not outlaw anybody striking who wanted to strike ....
do would be to outlaw such restraint and coercion as would prevent people from going to work
if they wished to go to work." 93 CONG. REC. 4436 (1947).
78. 105 S. Ct. at 3069, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 75.
79. 394 U.S. at 430; see supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
80. See 105 S. Ct. at 3070, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 76. One commentator has suggested that giving
this third part too much weight would swallow up the first two parts of the test and has
suggested that the third part should be used only to support the second element of the test that
makes unenforceable union rules that impair congressional labor policy. Comment, supra note
67, at 234.
81. 409 U.S. at 217-18; see supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
82. 105 S. Ct. at 3070, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 76.
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B. Public Policy of the Taft-Hartley Act
The Court next weighed the policy considerations Congress manifested in
the Taft-Hartley Act. The Court determined that the controlling policy of
83
the Act and of American labor law in general was voluntary unionism.
Although section 8(a)(3) of the Act validates union security agreements requiring all employees hired by the company to pay dues to the union,8 4 the
Court held that security agreements may not compel union members to
85
honor union rules with which they disagree.
The Court noted that the original Wagner Act permitted closed shop
agreements that required employees to become and remain union members.8

6

Because of the unpopularity of such agreements Congress amended

the Act to dispose of the closed shop. 87 Under section 8(a)(3) of the current
Act an employer may not fire an employee for disagreeing with union policy. 88 The employee need not agree with union policy; his only obligation is
to pay dues. 89 The Court thus determined that the past history of section
8(a)(3) implied a strong national policy of voluntary unionism. 90 The Court
then stated that although the discipline imposed by the union in Pattern
Makers' took the form of a fine as opposed to a firing, the distinction made
little difference as a fine equal to wages earned affects employment rights to
the same extent as being discharged. 9 1 Relying on this analysis, the Court
held the restriction on the right to resign imposed by the Pattern Makers'
92
League to be inconsistent with the policy of voluntary unionism.
83. Id.; see Millan, supra note 31, at 260.
84. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. . . . Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination
against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization ... (B) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues ....
85. 105 S. Ct. at 3071, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 77. Under the union security agreement, the union
membership requirement has been "whittled down to its financial core." NLRB v. General
Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). As a practical matter, however, the worker may wish
to become a full member. The union is his exclusive statutory bargaining agent. See supra
note 32. If a worker does not become a full member, he will have no influence in the union.
Thus, the union will determine how much dues will be and how they are spent without his
voice. The union could make expenditures for which the so-called limited member would
receive no benefits, such as strike compensation and recreational facilities. See Wellington,
supra note 32, at 1045-47.
86. 105 S. Ct. at 3070, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 77.
87. Id. at 3071, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 77.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. One commentator has argued that many problems could be cleared up if unions
would explain the ramifications of union security agreements to employees before the employees become full union members. Most members are unaware that full membership is not required. This information might dissuade many dissidents from joining the union and
strengthen solidarity in the long run. Gould, supra note 38, at 106.
91. 105 S. Ct. at 3071, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 77-78; see Wellington, supra note 32, at 1023.
92. 105 S. Ct. at 3071, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 78. The analysis of the policy issues is basically the
second part of the Scofield test: no rule shall impair a policy Congress has imbedded in the
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C. The Union's Arguments
The Court next addressed the union's three principal arguments: that the
internal discipline proviso of the Act validates resignation restrictions; that
the Act's legislative history supports such restrictions; and that unions
should be granted treatment similar to other voluntary associations. The
union first argued that the internal discipline proviso of the Act expressly
authorized restrictions on the right to resign because the proviso allows the
union to prescribe its own rules concerning the acquisition and retention of
membership. 93 The Court responded that neither the NLRB nor the
Supreme Court had ever interpreted the proviso to include restrictions on
the right to resign. 94 Rather, the Court historically adopted the interpretation that the proviso only covers expulsion and admission of members and
related enforcement mechanisms such as fines. 95 Since nothing in the legislative history indicated a contrary meaning, the Court granted deference to
the NLRB's interpretation of the proviso as not allowing restrictions on the
96
right to resign.
The union next argued that the legislative history of the Act expressed
congressional intent to allow restrictions on resignations. Section 8(c)(4) of
the original bill presented in the House of Representatives would have designated as unfair any labor practice that denied a member the right to resign
from a union at any time. 97 Congress, however, did not include the prohibition of restrictions on the right to resign in the Taft-Hartley Act. 98 The
union asserted that because Congress examined this issue and elected not to
include the provision in the Act, Congress did not consider restriction of a
member's right to resign an unfair labor practice. The Court rejected the
union's reasoning. Upon examination of the House of Representatives' purpose in considering section 8(c)(4) the Court concluded that the provision
was a reaction to closed shop agreements. 99 At the time of passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act, closed shop agreements were a much more common limitation on the right to resign than specific union rules that limited the
right.100 Thus, the Court found that the House proposed section 8(c)(4) out
of concern for closed shops. 101 The Court reasoned that the exclusion of the
House provision from the Act was only natural since the Act itself outlawed
labor laws. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Protesting,supra

note 67, at 224-35 (hypothetical discussion of how resignation restrictions should be resolved
under the Scofield test).
93.

105 S. Ct. at 3072, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 78.

94. Id., 87 L. Ed. 2d at 79.
95. Id. The Court cited Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 191-92, as interpreting the internal
discipline proviso to allow fines and expulsions. In Allis-Chalmers, however, the Court prefaced its statement with "At the very least," which implies that the internal discipline proviso
may allow more than just fines and expulsions. Id.
96. 105 S. Ct. at 3073-74, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 79-81.
97. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c)(4) (1947).
98. See 105 S. Ct. at 3073, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 80.
99. Id. Closed shops were outlawed by 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982); see supra note 84.
100. 105 S. Ct. at 3073, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 80.
101. Id.
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closed shops. 102
The Court further addressed the exclusion of section 8(c)(4) by noting
03
that section 8(c) of the House bill comprised a bill of rights for laborers.
The section listed acts that constituted unfair labor practices, including the
use of intimidation tactics on union members' families.1' 4 The Court reasoned that although the conference committee omitted the list of specific
prohibited acts from the final Act, Congress could not have intended to tolerate such action. 105 The Court concluded that Congress intended to cover
many of the provisions of the bill of rights under the general language of the
Taft-Hartley Act.' 0 6 Therefore, based on the legislative history of the Act,
the Court held as reasonable the NLRB's interpretation of restrictions on
the right to resign as restraint and coercion under the general language of
section 8(b)(1). 10 7 Again, the Court applied a standard that merely questioned the reasonableness of the NLRB's conclusions.' 0 8
The final argument that the union advanced concerned the law of voluntary associations, otherwise known as the law of free institutions. 0 9 The
union, relying on language from Granite State, asserted that the common
law doctrine of voluntary associations should apply to permit restrictions on
the right to resign. 1o The Court distinguished the language in GraniteState
by noting that the GraniteState opinion did not rely on the common law but
merely claimed to be consistent with it." I' The Court acknowledged that the
Act is not entirely consistent with the common law and occasionally invalidates union rules that would pass common law scrutiny.1 2 The Court thus
ruled that section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act superseded the common law and that the NLRB reasonably interpreted the Act to disallow
League Law 13.1 13
D. Concurringand Dissenting Opinions
In his concurring opinion Justice White expanded on the Court's deference to the NLRB. His opinion noted that the statutory language in question in Pattern Makers' could reasonably be interpreted as having two
conflicting meanings.' ' 4 Justice White wrote that in such a situation, when
102. Id.
103. Id. at 3073-74, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 80.
104. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c)(9) (1947).
105. 105 S. Ct. at 3074 n.23, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 80-81 n.23.
106. Id. at 3073-74, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 80.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3074, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 80.
109. See supra text accompanying note 63.
110. The Court stated in Granite State that "We have ... only to apply the law which
normally is reflected in our free institutions .... " 409 U.S. at 216.
111. 105 S. Ct. at 3074, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 81. The Court noted that whether the common law
of free associations allows restrictions or resignations is debatable. Id. at 3074 n.25, 87 L. Ed.
2d at 81 n.25.

112. Id. at 3074-75, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 81-82 (citing NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine &
Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968)).

113. 105 S. Ct. at 3075, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 82.
114. Id. at 3076, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 83-84.
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the legislative history fails to resolve the matter clearly, the Court must accord the NLRB an appropriate amount of deference. 1 15
Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall and
Brennan, disagreed with the majority on three grounds. First, he asserted
that League Law 13 regulated an internal affair and thus was not subject to
the NLRB's review.' 16 He asserted that the line between internal and external affairs lies where the union attempts to pressure the employer to take
action against an employee." 7 Second, Justice Blackmun stated that the
majority's interpretation of the internal discipline proviso of the Act was
unjustifiably limited. 1 8 He pointed out that the Senate rejected section
8(c)(4) of the House bill, part of the bill of rights for workers." 9 He reasoned that the final Act did not intend to protect the member's right to
resign, and since this right is not protected, the internal discipline proviso
grants the union the power to make rules affecting that right.120
Justice Blackmun concluded by contending that the law of voluntary associations should apply to League Law 13.121 Under the common law, associations may restrict a member's right to resign if a legitimate interest for
such a rule exists.' 22 Justice Blackmun reasoned that since allowing members to venture into and out of the union at will would limit the effectiveness
of a strike, the union has the legitimate interest to restrict its members' resignations. 23 Justice Blackmun urged that such a rule does not limit the members' section 7 rights; giving up the right to resign is merely a sacrifice to be
made in order to gain the benefits of collective bargaining. 124 Justice Blackmun stated that no evidence showed that the workers were unaware of their
promises to fellow workers not to resign.1 25 Justice Blackmun thus concluded that the workers waived their right to resign and that the Court was
26
wrong to rubber-stamp the NLRB's decision.'
III.

CONCLUSION

In announcing its holding in Pattern Makers' v. NLRB the Court made a
clear policy choice. The original Wagner Act established the policy that
115. Id. at 3076, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 84.
116. Id. at 3078, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 85.
117. Id. at 3078, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 86. The majority responded to this argument by stating
that in previous cases, the NLRB has regulated actions other than union pressure on employers. Id. at 3072 n.20, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 79 n.20.
118. Id. at 3079, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 87.
119. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 97-107.
120. 105 S. Ct. at 3079, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 88. The majority responded to this contention by
relying on Senator Taft's statement that under § 8(b)(1) the union could not "coerce employees, either their own members or those outside the union." 93 CONG. REC. 4023 (1947). Thus,
the majority reasoned, Congress did not "explicitly reject" all of the bill of rights encompassed
by House bill § 8(c). 105 S. Ct. at 3074 n.23, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 81-82 n.23.
121. 105 S. Ct. at 3082, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 90.

122. Id.
123. Id. at 3083, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 92.
124. Id. at 3083, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 92-93.
125. Id. at 3084-85, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 93-94.
126. Id. at 3084, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 93.
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workers can accomplish more by acting collectively than they can by individual action. The Taft-Hartley amendments implemented the policy of voluntary unionism that demands that the worker be free to join in or refrain
from concerted activities. The Pattern Makers' Court embraced the policy
of voluntary unionism and thus protected the freedoms of individual
workers.
Because of the Court's policy choice, a union cannot promote solidarity
during strikes by imposing fines on those members who resign. Such fines
levied by a union discourage the workers from resigning. This effect violates
the policy of voluntary unionism.
The Court's decision is likely to diminish the role of labor unions. The
practical effect of the decision, however, will benefit both workers and the
economy. Without the ability to discipline resigning members, unions will
be forced to act quickly, bargain in good faith, and avoid long strikes in
order to prevent the resignation of members.
Thomas J. Irons

